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CAMPBELL v. GREER: IMPEACHING WITNESSES
WITH PRIOR CONVICTION EVIDENCE IN A CIVIL
TRIAL
Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence' to assist courts in
ascertaining the truth and reaching just outcomes in federal trials. 2 As a
means of uncovering the truth, the Federal Rules of Evidence allow any
party in a federal trial to attack the credibility of a witness.3 Attorneys may
attack a witness' credibility, for example, by introducing evidence of the
witness' prior criminal convictions. 4 Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence requires courts to admit evidence of certain prior convictions.,
Rule 403, however, empowers a trial judge to exclude relevant evidence if

1. 28 U.S.C. app. (1988).
2. FED. R. Evm. 102. Rule 102 mandates that courts construe the Federal Rules of
Evidence to secure fairness in trial administration, to eliminate expense and delay, and to
develop the law of evidence. Id. Rule 102 further provides that courts should construe the
Federal Rules of Evidence to ascertain the truth and promote fair determinations of disputes.
Id.
3. See FED. R. Evm. 607 (stating that any party may attack credibility of witness).
4. See 2 WiuioRE, EVIDENCE § 519 at 726 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1979) (discussing use of
prior conviction evidence for impeachment purposes). At common law courts disqualified
convicted persons from testifying in court as part of the punishment for previous crimes. Id.
Later authorities theorized that a court could not trust a convicted person's testimony. Id.; 3
J. WEINSTN, EVIDENCE 609[02] at 609-58 (1988). Weinstein argues that the theory that prior
convictions are relevant to a witness' credibility depends on a two part assumption: first, that
a person with a criminal past possesses a bad general character, and second, that a person of
such character would disregard the obligation to testify truthfully. Id at 609-59. Weinstein
concludes that this two part assumption rests on assumptions about a person's character that
people make in everyday life. Id.
5. FED. R. Evn,. 609(a). Rule 609(a) provides:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public
record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death
or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted,
and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs
its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
Id.
Rule 609(a) thereby establishes that a court should balance the probative value of the
prior conviction evidence against the prejudicial effect of the evidence to determine whether
or not to admit the evidence. Id. One commentator asserts that the rule 609(a) balancing test
arose out of Luck v. United States. 3 J. WEn'sTmIN, EVIDENCE 609101] at 609-52 (1988). See
Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (allowing trial judges to exercise
sound discretion under statute permitting admission of prior convictions to impeach witness'
credibility). The Luck court construed 14 D.C. CODE ANN. § 305 (1961) to permit a trial
judge to determine the admissibility of prior conviction evidence based upon the circumstances
of the case. Luck, 348 F.2d at 768. The Luck court argued that the trial judge may exclude
prior conviction evidence if the judge believes the prejudicial effect of the evidence far outweighs
the probative value of the evidence. Id.
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the prejudicial effect of the evidence substantially outweighs the probative

value of the evidence. 6 Because rule 609 requires courts to admit certain
evidence, regardless of prejudicial effect, while rule 403 broadly permits
exclusion of highly prejudicial evidence, rules 609 and 403 appear inconsis-

tent.7 Although some courts have resolved the apparent inconsistency between rules 609 and 403,8 many courts continue to disagree over the

applicability and interaction of these evidentiary rules in civil trials. 9 In

Campbell v. Greer10 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh

Circuit considered whether rule 609(a) or rule 403 allowed the court to
exclude evidence of a civil plaintiff's prior criminal conviction that the
defendant offered to impeach the plaintiff's credibility."
In Campbell Rudolph Campbell, an inmate at an Illinois state prison,
sued various prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.12 Campbell charged
6. FED. R. Evm. 403. Rule 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.
Id. The Advisory Committee's Note to rule 403 provides that unfair prejudice, within the
context of rule 403, involves an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis.
FED. R. Evm. 403 advisory committee's note. The committee suggested that juries often
improperly base decisions on emotions. Id. Consequently, the committee designed rule 403 to
allow a trial judge to exclude otherwise relevant evidence that might lead to an improperlybased jury decision. Id.
7. Compare Diaz v. Cianci, 737 F.2d 138, 139 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that trial judge
acted properly in excluding potentially prejudicial prior conviction evidence under rule 403)
and Shows v. M/V Red Eagle, 695 F.2d 114, 119 (5th Cir. 1983) (reversing trial judge who
failed to apply rule 403 to exclude prejudicial prior conviction evidence) and United States v.
Dixon, 547 F.2d 1079, 1083 n.4 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting that in certain cases rule 403 allows
trial judge discretion to exclude prior conviction evidence) with United States v. Kuecker, 740
F.2d 496, 502 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding that trial court lacks discretion to exclude evidence of
prior convictions involving dishonesty or false statement under rule 609(a)(2)) and United
States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d 349, 354 (Ist Cir. 1981) (ruling that evidence offered under rule
609(a)(2) is not subject to rule 403 balancing test).
8. See, e.g., Jones v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 844 F.2d 500, 505 (8th Cir. 1988)
(ruling that court using rule 403 balancing test could exclude evidence of prior convictions
admissible under rule 609 without rule 609(a) balancing test), petition for cert. filed, U.S.L.W. - (U.S. Aug. 18, 1988) (No. -); Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 582 (3d Cir. 1984)
(holding that rule 609 governs admissibility of prior conviction evidence to impeach witness
and precludes application of rule 403), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1078 (1985); Czajka v. Hickman,
703 F.2d 317, 319 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding that rule 609 does not foreclose trial court's duty
to apply rule 403 balancing test); infra notes 109-21 and accompanying text (discussing Diggs
court's holding that rule 609 preempts rule 403 in civil trials).
9. See infra notes 109-35 and accompanying text (discussing circuit courts' conflicting
holdings on interaction between rule 609 and rule 403).
10. 831 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1987).
11. See Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 703, 705 (7th Cir. 1987) (considering proper
application of rule 609 and rule 403 in civil trial).
12. Id. at 701. In Campbell the plaintiff, Campbell, brought suit under Section 1 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, now 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides that a citizen may sue a state
employee who injures the citizen by depriving the citizen of his legal or constitutional rights.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1986).
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that prison officials had deprived Campbell of his eighth amendment right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 3 Campbell claimed that he
specifically had asked the prison guards to deadlock his cell to protect him
from certain fellow inmates.' 4 Campbell alleged that because the guards
failed to deadlock his cell, other inmates were able to enter the cell and
stab Campbell repeatedly.s The trial court entered judgment for the defendants.' 6 Campbell appealed the ruling to the United States Court of Appeals
7
for the Seventh Circuit.1
On appeal Campbell argued that the trial court erroneously instructed
the jury and improperly admitted evidence of Campbell's prior rape conviction.1 8 The Seventh Circuit, however, affirmed the lower court's ruling. 19
Initially the court scrutinized the district court's jury instruction on the
eighth amendment issue of cruel and unusual punishment. 2 0 The court noted
that the instruction closely followed judicial precedent in the Seventh Circuit
by requiring the plaintiff to prove that the defendants knew of imminent
danger to the plaintiff and consciously refused to protect the plaintiff in
order to establish cruel and unusual punishment. 2' The Campbell court,
therefore, concluded that the district court properly instructed the jury on
the applicable cruel and unusual punishment standard. 22
13. Campbell, 831 F.2d at 701. The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
The eighth amendment protects state prisoners through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (holding that California statute
that allows cruel and unusual punishment violates fourteenth amendment), reh'g denied, 371
U.S. 905 (1962).
14. Campbell, 831 F.2d at 701.
15. Id. Campbell and his witnesses, all inmates, testified that prior to the stabbing,
Campbell learned that he was the target for an attack by other inmates. Id. Campbell asked
the defendant prison guards to deadlock his cell so that the cell would remain locked when a
prison official threw open the master switch. Id. The defendants, however, failed to deadlock
Campbell's cell, and a few inmates entered Campbell's cell and stabbed Campbell. Id. The
defendants did not deny that the stabbing occurred but insisted that Campbell never asked
any of them to deadlock his cell. Id.
16. Id.at 701.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 701-02; see infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (discussing Campbell's
three arguments on appeal).
19. Campbell, 831 F.2d at 708.
20. Id. at 702.
21. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Campbell found
that the instruction paralleled the standard for cruel and unusual punishment that the Seventh
Circuit outlined in Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 816 (1986). Campbell, 831 F.2d at 702. To establish a cruel and unusual punishment
claim, the Duckworth standard requires the plaintiff to show that prison guards realized that
an imminent danger existed and consciously and knowingly refused to take steps to avert the
danger. Duckworth, 780 F.2d at 653. The Campbell court held that the trial judge correctly
instructed the jury on the Duckworth standard. Campbell, 831 F.2d at 703. The Campbell
court explained, further, that the essence of Campbell was witness credibility, not jury
instructions. Id. The Seventh Circuit concluded that a slightly altered instruction would not
have affected the trial verdict. Id.
22. Id.
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After approving the district court's jury instruction, the Seventh Circuit

addressed Campbell's claim that the district court improperly allowed the
defendants to use Campbell's prior rape conviction at trial to impeach
Campbell's credibility as a witness. 23 Campbell advanced three arguments
in favor of reversing the lower court's evidentiary ruling.M First, Campbell
argued that the trial judge should have used a rule 609(a) balancing test to
weigh the probative value of the evidence against the prejudicial effect of

the evidence. 25 Second, Campbell asserted that the trial judge should have
excluded the evidence under rule 403.26 Finally, Campbell insisted that the

lower court should have prevented the defense counsel from eliciting the
specific nature of the prior conviction. 27
Noting that the proper use of a criminal conviction to impeach a witness
28
in a civil case was a question of first impression in the Seventh Circuit,
the court initially looked to the text and legislative history of rule 609 for
guidance. 29 As a threshold matter the Seventh Circuit asserted that rule

609(a) requires a court to balance the probative value against the prejudicial
effect of the prior conviction evidence only where the evidence might

prejudice the defendant.3 0 Because Campbell was a plaintiff, the court held
that Campbell could not ask for a rule 609(a) balancing test with respect

23. Id.

24. Id. at 703, 705, 707; see infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (discussing
Campbell's three arguments on appeal).
25. Campbell, 831 F.2d at 703. Campbell asserted that rule 609(a)(1) required the trial
court to balance prejudicial effect against probative value before admitting evidence of
Campbell's prior rape conviction. Id.
26. Id. at 705. Campbell argued that rule 403 required the trial judge to exclude the
prior conviction evidence because the unfair prejudice of the evidence substantially outweighed
its probative value. Id.
27. Id. at 707. Campbell argued that the trial court should have allowed into evidence
only the fact that Campbell was a convicted felon. Id.
28. Id. at 703; see Christmas v. Sanders, 759 F.2d 1284, 1293 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding
exclusion of plaintiff's prior rape conviction). Christmas involved a civil rights action against
a police officer. Id. at 1286, 1287. The trial court excluded evidence of the plaintiff's prior
rape conviction and found for the plaintiff. Id. at 1287. On appeal the Seventh Circuit
considered whether the trial court's exclusion of the prior conviction evidence was an abuse
of discretion. Id. at 1289. The court found no abuse of discretion but declined to resolve the
issue of whether rule 609 or rule 403 governed the admissibility of a civil plaintiff's prior
felony conviction. Id. at 1291, 1293. Consequently, the prior conviction issue in Campbell was
not entirely a question of first impression for the Seventh Circuit. Campbell, 831 F.2d at 703.
29. See id. at 703-04 (discussing legislative history of rule 609); supra note 5 (text of
rule 609(a)); infra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of rule 609).
30. Campbell, 831 F.2d at 703. As the Campbell court noted, other courts have observed
that defendants, but not plaintiffs, can demand a rule 609(a) balancing test. Id. at 704; see
Roshan v. Fard, 705 F.2d 102, 104 (4th Cir. 1983) (ruling balancing test of rule 609(a) applies
only in situations involving possible prejudice to defendant); Garnett v. Kepner, 541 F. Supp.
241, 244 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that trial court erroneously considered whether plaintiff
would suffer prejudice if court admitted evidence of plaintiff's prior convictions). But see
Petty v. Ideco, 761 F.2d 1146, 1152 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that rule 609(a) balancing test
protects plaintiffs in civil cases).

1989]

PRIOR CONVICTION EVIDENCE

to his prior conviction.3" The court acknowledged that restricting the rule
609(a) balancing test to defendants in civil suits would offer an unfair
advantage to civil defendants.3 2 The court refused, however, to follow
Campbell's suggestion that the rule 609(a) balancing test applies in criminal
and civil trials to every witness whose testimony an opposing party seeks
to impeach with prior conviction evidence. 33 Instead, the Seventh Circuit
interpreted rule 609(a) to allow only a criminal defendant who testifies to
demand that a court balance the probative value and the prejudicial effect
of evidence of the defendant's prior criminal convictions.14 In support of
3
its interpretation the court examined the legislative history of rule 609. 1
The Seventh Circuit specifically relied on the Conference Report to rule 609
in finding that the legislators intended the rule 609(a) balancing test to
protect only criminal defendants. 6 The court asserted that the Conference
Report made clear that a judge should only consider the prejudicial effect
of prior conviction evidence to a criminal defendant.37 According to the
Seventh Circuit, therefore, an adverse party in a civil trial always may use
38
a witness' prior convictions to impeach that witness.
The Campbell court next addressed Campbell's claim that the district
court should have applied rule 403 to exclude evidence of Campbell's prior
rape conviction. 39 The court noted that rule 403 requires courts to exclude
evidence only if the prejudicial effect of the evidence substantially outweighs
the probative value of the evidence. 4° The Seventh Circuit further explained
41
that rule 403 applies only to situations that specific rules do not cover.
The court stated that rule 609(a) is a specific rule that governs the admissibility of prior conviction evidence offered to impeach a witness. 42 The
court concluded, therefore, that the scope of rule 609(a) prevents rule 403

31. Campbell, 831 F.2d at 703.
32. Id. The Campbell court noted that chance often determines which party is defendant
and which party is plaintiff in a civil suit. Id. The court concluded, therefore, that allowing
civil defendants, but not civil plaintiffs, to object when opposing counsel seeks to introduce
criminal records to impeach an opponent's testimony would be unfair. Id.
33. Id. In Campbell Campbell argued that rule 609(a) required a balancing of probative
value against prejudicial effect with regard to every witness in every federal criminal and civil
trial in which a party seeks to use prior conviction evidence to impeach a witness. Id.
34. Id. at 704.
35. Id. at 703-04; see infra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history
of rule 609).
36. Campbell, 831 F.2d at 704; see infra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing
legislative history of rule 609).
37. Campbell, 831 F.2d at 704.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 705; see supra note 6 and accompanying text (text of rule 403).
40. Campbell, 831 F.2d at 705. The Campbell court noted that the party opposing the
use of evidence under rule 403 has the burden of persuading the trial judge to exclude the
evidence. Id.
41. Id.; see infra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing Advisory Committee's
Note which states that rule 403 applies in situations where no other rule specifically applies).
42. Campbell, 831 F.2d at 705.
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from governing the admissibility of prior conviction evidence in either a
criminal or a civil trial. 43 The Seventh Circuit feared that authorizing courts
to apply rule 403 to prior conviction evidence would enable future Seventh
Circuit courts to use rule 403 to exclude evidence of prior crimes involving
dishonesty or false statement. 44 The Campbell court stated that using rule
403 to exclude evidence of prior convictions involving dishonesty or false

statement impermissibly would override rule 609(a)(2), which demands ad-45
mission of evidence of convictions involving dishonesty or false statement.
Acknowledging that other circuit courts have permitted a civil plaintiff to
invoke the rule 403 balancing test when the defendant sought to impeach

the plaintiff with prior conviction evidence, 46 the Seventh Circuit argued
that these courts have failed to offer a sufficient justification for allowing

rule 403 to preempt rule 609(a) in civil cases. 47 The Seventh Circuit concluded, therefore, that a civil plaintiff may not object under either rule 403
or rule 609(a) when opposing counsel seeks to impeach the plaintiff's
4
testimony with evidence of a prior felony conviction. 1
Finally, the Campbell court dismissed Campbell's submission that the
district court erred by allowing into evidence the nature of Campbell's prior

conviction. 49 Finding no authority for suppressing the nature of a prior
felony used to impeach a witness' testimony, the court refused to set a

precedent.50 The Seventh Circuit cautioned, however, that parties may

43. Id. at 706.
44. Id. at 705.
45. Id. at 705-06. The Campbell court considered the potential for using rule 403 to
override the express direction under rule 609(a)(2) to admit evidence of prior crimes involving
dishonesty or false statement to be the most compelling reason for declining to exclude any
prior conviction evidence under rule 403. Id.; see supra note 5 (text of rule 609(a)).
46. Campbell, 831 F.2d at 706; see infra notes 122-35 and accompanying text (discussing
cases that have applied rule 403 to prior conviction evidence offered in civil trials).
47. See Campbell, 831 F.2d at 706 (finding unpersuasive other courts' reasons for allowing
civil plaintiff to invoke rule 403 balancing test to exclude prior conviction evidence). The
Seventh Circuit argued that Shows v. M/V Red Eagle, 695 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1983), one of
the first cases that allowed a civil plaintiff to demand a rule 403 balancing test when the
defendant sought to introduce evidence of plaintiff's prior convictions, stood on weak precedent. Campbell, 831 F.2d at 706; see infra notes 125-35 and accompanying text (discussing
Shows). Consequently, the Seventh Circuit in Campbell declined to follow Shows and held
that rule 403 has no application to the use of prior conviction evidence to impeach a witness
in a civil trial. Campbell, 831 F.2d at 706.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 707.
50. Id. at 707. The Campbell court could have relied on United States v. Wilson, 556
F.2d 1177, 1178 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 986 (1977), for authority to suppress the
nature of the prior felony. The court in Wilson held that the prosecution could elicit whether
defendant had been convicted of a felony but not whether the conviction had been for rape.
Wilson, 556 F.2d at 1178. See generally Gold, Sanitizing Prior Conviction Impeachment
Evidence to Reduce its PrejudicialEffects, 27 Aiz. L. REv. 691 (1985) (asserting that courts
should admit evidence of prior felony conviction without admitting evidence of nature of
felony). In his article, Gold details the advantages of "sanitization," a procedure by which
opposing counsel can inform the jury that the defendant has a prior felony conviction without
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introduce only the date and nature of the charged crime and the disposition
of the case. 5 The court agreed that defense counsel may have exceeded
these limits in Campbell, but the court refused to grant a new trial solely
52
because of defense counsel's excesses.
In a concurring opinion in Campbell, Judge Will criticized the majority's
conclusion that rule 403 never applies to prior conviction evidence in civil
actions. 53 Judge Will asserted that rule 609 preempts rule 403 only in those
instances to which rule 609 directly applies. 4 The concurring judge stated
that rule 609 does not govern prior conviction evidence in all cases and,
therefore, does not preempt completely rule 403.11 Judge Will acknowledged
that, at present, the exact scope of rule 609 is unclear.5 6 The concurring
judge suggested, therefore, that Congress amend rule 609 and rule 403 to
57
clarify the scope of each rule and the interaction between the rules.
The Seventh Circuit correctly determined that rule 609(a) does not
require courts to weigh the probative value of prior conviction evidence
against the prejudicial effect of the evidence in a civil trial. 8 The language
of rule 609(a), the legislative history of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and
case law construing rule 609(a) support the Campbell court's interpretation
of rule 609(a).59 In subsection (a)(1) of rule 609 the drafters expressly address
the potentially prejudicial effect of prior conviction evidence on defendants. 60
Unlike subsection (a)(2), which requires courts to admit evidence of a party's
prior conviction of any crime involving dishonesty or false statement,
subsection (a)(1) explicitly protects defendants from the prejudicial effect

specifically identifying the felony. Id. at 693. Gold believes that sanitization promotes uniformity in the law of admission of prior conviction evidence, erases any undeserved benefit a
defendant might receive from suppression of evidence of a prior conviction, and decreases the
likelihood that a conviction will result from an improper use of a defendant's record. Id. at
702.
51. Campbell, 831 F.2d at 707.
52. Id. at 707-08. In Campbell defense counsel in his opening statement referred to
Campbell as a convicted rapist and, later in the trial, asked Campbell where the rape had
occurred. Id. at 708.
53. Id. In his concurring opinion in Campbell, Judge Will found illogical and unnecessary
the majority's conclusion that rule 403 never applies to prior conviction evidence in civil cases.
Id. Judge Will suggested that the majority's decision too severely restricts the use of rule 403
in civil cases. Id.
54. Id. at 709. In his concurring opinion in Campbell, Judge Will asserted that rule 609
should apply only in criminal cases. Id.
55. Id. at 708-09.
56. Id. at 709.
57. Id.
58. See infra notes 65-70, 91-98 and accompanying text (discussing propriety of Seventh
Circuit's holding that rule 609(a) balancing test does not govern admissibility of prior conviction
evidence in civil cases).
59. See infra notes 65-70, 91-98 and accompanying text (supporting Seventh Circuit's
holding that rule 609(a) balancing test does not govern admissibility of prior conviction
evidence in civil cases).
60. See supra note 5 (text of rule 609(a)).
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of admitting evidence of prior criminal convictions. 61 As the Seventh Circuit
noted, however, by restricting application of the rule 609(a) balancing test
to civil defendants, courts unfairly would favor civil defendants who, unlike
civil plaintiffs, could move for the exclusion of evidence of prior criminal
conduct. 62 The Campbell court argued that the drafters of rule 609(a) could
not have intended such an advantage for civil defendants. 6 The court,
therefore, looked beyond the text of rule 609(a) to legislative history to
determine the rule's scope. 64
By thoroughly analyzing the legislative history of rule 609, the Campbell
court appropriately determined that the drafters intended to reserve the
protection of subsection (a)(1) for criminal defendants. 65 Although some
Congressmen apparently intended rule 609 to apply to civil cases,6 the

Conference Committee Notes to rule 609 and the majority of legislators'
remarks show that prejudice to criminal defendants was the primary concern

of the rule's drafters. 67 The Conference Committee noted that the probative

61. See United States v. Greschner, 647 F.2d 740, 742 n.1 (7th Cir. 1981) (noting that
prior conviction evidence tends to be so prejudicial to defendant that, absent compelling
circumstances, courts should not admit prior conviction evidence under rule 609(a)).
62. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing Campbell court's rationale for
denying civil plaintiffs and civil defendants use of rule 609(a) balancing test).
63. Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 1987); see infra note 67 and
accompanying text (discussing legislative history of rule 609).
64. See infra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of rule 609).
65. See Campbell, 831 F.2d at 703 (holding that only criminal defendant may demand
rule 609(a) balancing test with respect to prior conviction evidence).
66. See 120 CONG. REc. 2377, 2379, 2381 (1974) (containing statements of Rep. Dennis,
Rep. Hogan, and Rep. Lott). In a congressional debate concerning rule 609, Representative
Dennis stated that rule 609 should apply to any witness, not just a criminal defendant. Id. at
2377. Representative Hogan said that rule 609 applies to all witnesses in civil as well as criminal
cases. Id. at 2379. Representative Lott asserted that rule 609 would apply in civil and criminal
cases. Id. at 2381. See Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 581 (3d Cir. 1984) (relying on
Representatives' remarks to support holding that rule 609 applies to govern admissibility of
prior conviction evidence in civil trials), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1078 (1985).
67. See H.R. CoNt. REP. No. 1597, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMN. Naws 7098, 7103 (containing House Conference Committee remarks
on rule 609). The House Conference Committee decided that courts should weigh under rule
609(a) the prejudicial effect of prior conviction evidence to the defendant. Id. Congress
considered but dismissed possible dangers of prejudice to a nondefendant witness, such as
injury to the witness's reputation, as elements to be weighed in determining admissibility of
prior conviction evidence. Id. The Committee concluded that the need of the trier of fact to
have as much relevant evidence of witness credibility as possible outweighed any possible
prejudice to a nondefendant witness. Id.
Most of the Congressmen spoke in terms of rule 609's applicability to criminal trials. See
120 CONG. REc. 2375-82 (1974) (containing statements of Representatives concerning scope of
rule 609). Representative Hogan suggested that courts should not allow prosecutors to base
their accusations on the testimony of witnesses who are convicted felons but appear to have
unblemished records. Id. at 2376, 2380. Representative Dennis cautioned that a court should
not convict a criminal defendant solely because of the defendant's bad character. Id. at 2377.
Representative Hungate noted, however, that the prior conviction of a defense witness might
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value of prior conviction evidence necessarily outweighs possible prejudice
to witnesses other than criminal defendants. 6 The committee, however,
perceived several potentially prejudicial consequences of admitting prior
conviction evidence against criminal defendants. 69 To provide criminal defendants with heightened protection, therefore, Congress developed the rule
609(a) balancing test.10

have a prejudicial effect on the criminal defendant. 120 CONG. REc. at 40,891.
A few Congressmen emphasized that rule 609 would in no way inhibit a criminal
defendant's right to impeach a prosecution witness. See id. at 40,891, 40,894 (containing
statements of Representatives concerning criminal defendants' right to impeach prosecution
witnesses). Representative Dennis commented that a defendant can cross-examine a government
witness about any of the witness' prior convictions. Id. at 40,894. Representative Hungate
asserted that rule 609(a) would permit criminal defendants to impeach prosecution witnesses
with prior felony convictions. Id. at 40,891.
68. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing Conference Committee's belief
that jury's need for evidence of witness credibility outweighed any possible prejudice to
nondefendant witnesses).
69. See 120 CONG. REc. 2377, 2379 (1974) (containing statements of Rep. Dennis and
Rep. Wiggins); 3 D. LouisELL & C. MUELRn, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 315 at 316-18 (1979)
(stating problems with impeachment by prior conviction evidence). Louisell and Mueller state
three potential problems with impeachment by prior convictions. Id. at 316. First, the prior
conviction evidence may be irrelevant to the subsequent case. Id. Second, the prior conviction
evidence may shock juries and render jurors unable to confine their consideration of the prior
conviction to the issue of the witness' veracity. Id. at 317. In essence, the jury may conclude
that a defendant who committed a crime once will do so again. Id.; see United States v.
Bagley, 765 F.2d 836, 841 (9th Cir.) (finding substantial risk that jury will conclude from
similar prior conviction that defendant also committed subsequent crime), vacated, 772 F.2d
482 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1023 (1986); United States v. Preston, 608 F.2d
626, 639 (5th Cir. 1979) (recognizing danger that jury will think that criminal forever remains
criminal), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940 (1980). But see United States v. Browne, 829 F.2d 760,
764 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1298 (1988) (upholding admission of defendant's
prior bank robbery conviction in trial for armed bank robbery); United States v. Washington,
746 F.2d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding admission of defendant's prior robbery conviction
in trial for bank robbery). Third, a defense witness' convictions may harm the credibility of
the accused and possibly endanger the right of the accused to a fair trial. 3 D. LOTJSELL &
C. MUELLER supra at 318. Louisell and Mueller warn that defendants should not be subject
to guilt by association. Id.
70. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (text of rule 609). Rule 609(a)(1) directs the
trial judge to weigh the potential prejudicial effect to the defendant of admitting the prior
conviction evidence against the probative value of the evidence. FED. R. EvED. 609; see United
States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir.) (discussing factors that judges should consider
in making rule 609(a) determination), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1025 (1976).
In Mahone the trial judge admitted evidence of Mahone's prior robbery conviction. Id.
at 928. On appeal Mahone argued that the trial judge erred in not making an on-the-record
rule 609(a) determination. Id. The Seventh Circuit upheld the trial judge's admission of the
prior conviction evidence. Id. The Seventh Circuit suggested factors that judges should consider
in future cases in making a rule 609(a) determination. Id at 929. First, the Seventh Circuit
suggested that the judge should consider how valuable the prior crime evidence is for impeaching
the witness' testimony. Id. Second, the judge should take into account the witness' conduct
since the conviction and the age of the conviction. Id. Third, the judge should note the
similarity between the past crime and the crime charged. Id. Fourth, the judge should consider
the importance of the defendant's testimony and the likelihood that the case will turn on the
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Case law moderately supports the Campbell court's holding that civil
plaintiffs may not demand a rule 609(a) balancing test to evaluate the
admissibility of prior conviction evidence.7 1 Although the circuit courts agree
that the rule 609(a) balancing test applies to criminal defendants, 72 only the
United States Courts of Appeal for the Third and Fifth Circuits have held
that the balancing test also protects civil plaintiffs. 71 In Petty v. Ideco74 the

plaintiff brought a products liability action to recover damages for injuries
that the plaintiff incurred while working on an oil well servicing unit that
the defendant manufactured. 75 At trial the defendant, Ideco, introduced
evidence of the plaintiff's prior criminal history.7 6 The jury returned a

verdict for the defendant. 77 On appeal the Fifth Circuit considered the
plaintiff's argument that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of the

plaintiff's prior criminal history without balancing the probative value of
the evidence against the prejudicial effect of the evidence under rule 609(a).7"
The Fifth Circuit dismissed the defendant's contention that the rule 609(a)
balancing test does not apply to civil plaintiffs. 79 The Fifth Circuit explained

credibility of the parties. Id; see also United States v. Preston, 608 F.2d 626, 639 (5th Cir.
1979) (remanding to trial court for on-the-record determination that probative value of evidence
of prior bank robbery outweighed prejudicial effect), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940 (1980); United
States v. Gross, 603 F.2d 757, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (holding that trial court
abused its discretion in admitting prior narcotics conviction without any explanation). Courts
urge judges to make rule 609(a) determinations on the record to allow for effective appellate
review. Preston, 608 F.2d at 639.
71. See infra notes 82-90 and accompanying text (discussing precedent supporting Campbell court's rule 609 holding).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Roenigk, 810 F.2d 809, 816 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding error
in trial court's admitting overly prejudicial and irrelevant evidence of defendant's prior crimes);
United States v. Bagley, 765 F.2d 836, 842 (9th Cir.) (holding trial court's erroneous rule 609
determination harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt of criminal defendant),
vacated, 772 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1023 (1986); United States v.
Washington, 746 F.2d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding ruling under rule 609(a) that
defendant's prior robbery conviction was admissible in present trial on robbery charge); United
States v. Ras, 713 F.2d 311, 318 (7th Cir. 1983) (agreeing with trial court's explicit findings
under rule 609(a) that probative value of admitting evidence of Ras' prior convictions would
outweigh any prejudicial effect to Ras).
73. See Petty v. Ideco, 761 F.2d 1146, 1152 (5th Cir. 1985) (rejecting defendant's
contention that rule 609(a) balancing test did not apply to civil plaintiff); Diggs v. Lyons, 741
F.2d 577, 582 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that trial judge correctly applied rule 609(a) balancing
test in admitting Diggs' prior convictions in civil trial), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1078 (1985).
74. 761 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1985).
75. See Petty v. Ideco, 761 F.2d 1146, 1149 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing plaintiff's cause
of action). In the course of his work, Petty entangled his arm in line rope that wound around
the cathead of defendant manufacturer's oil well servicing unit. Id.
76. Id. Petty's prior convictions were armed kidnapping in 1974 and issuing a check
with the intent to defraud in 1980. Id. at 1151-52. Petty violated the conditions of his probation
resulting from the kidnapping conviction and, consequently, was in jail until 1977. Id. at 1152.
77. Id. at 1149.
78. Id. at 1152.
79. Id. The Petty court characterized as unfounded the defendant's contention that the
rule 609(a) balancing test does not apply to civil plaintiffs. Id.
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that the trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to allow a
party to use a prior conviction for impeachment purposes. 0 Therefore, the
Petty court concluded that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
admitting evidence of the plaintiff's prior conviction. 81
Unlike the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the
United States Courts of Appeal for the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, along
with numerous district courts and commentators, have concluded that the
rule 609(a) balancing test protects only criminal defendants. 2 In Donald v.

80. Id. The Petty court acknowledged that the prejudicial effect of the prior conviction
evidence came close to outweighing the probative value of the evidence in Petty but refused
to find that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the prior conviction evidence.
Id.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Donald v. Wilson, 847 F.2d 1191, 1197 n.4 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that
Congress did not intend rule 609(a) to protect civil plaintiffs); Jones v. Board of Police
Comm'rs, 844 F.2d 500, 505 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that civil plaintiff lacks standing to
invoke rule 609(a) balancing test), petition for cert. filed, - U.S.L.W. - (U.S. Aug. 18,
1988) (No. -); Lewis v. Sheriff's Dep't, 817 F.2d 465, 467 (8th Cir.) (upholding admission
of civil plaintiff's prior convictions under rule 609(a) because of importance of determining
plaintiff's credibility as witness), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 298 (1987); Moore v. Volkswagenwerk,
575 F. Supp. 919, 920-21 (D. Md. 1983) (finding rule 609(a) improper rule for examining
admissibility of prior conviction evidence in civil trial); Tussel v. Witco Chem. Corp., 555 F.
Supp. 979, 984 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (concluding that rule 609(a) affords no protection to civil
plaintiff).
In Tussel, the plaintiff sued to recover for injuries that he incurred when a hose that
defendant's employee allegedly mishandled ruptured and sprayed carbolic acid on the plaintiff.
Tussel, 555 F. Supp. at 980. The United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania prohibited the defendant from attacking the plaintiff's credibility by introducing
evidence of the plaintiff's prior guilty plea to a conspiracy felony. Id. at 979. In determining
whether the defendant could attack the plaintiff's credibility with prior conviction evidence,
the district court considered the evidence under both rule 403 and rule 609(a). Id. at 980, 984.
While ultimately excluding the prior conviction evidence under rule 403, the district court first
concluded that rule 609(a) did not bar admission of the prior conviction evidence. Id. at 984.
The Tussel court reasoned that the drafters of rule 609(a)(1) primarily intended to avoid
prejudice to criminal defendants. Id. at 983. The court further noted that the language and
legislative history of rule 609 did not mandate mechanical application of the rule 609(a)
balancing test when the party potentially subject to prejudice is not a criminal defendant. Id.
The court asserted that, in a civil case, evidence concerning the plaintiff's prior criminal
conduct likely will be tangential or entirely irrelevant to the issues at hand. Id. The court thus
concluded that the special protection provided by rule 609(a)(1) is applicable only to criminal
defendants. Id. at 984; see also 3 D. LonsE.L & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVDmENCE § 316 at
324 (1979) (rule 609(a) does not authorize exclusion of prior convictions offered for impeachment purposes in civil litigation); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 43 at 94 (3d ed. 1984) (parties
can utilize prior felony convictions without rule 609(a) weighing process in civil cases); 10 J.
MooRE & H. BENDIX, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACrCE § 609.14 [4] (2d ed. 1988) (stating that rule
609(a)(1) sensibly cannot apply in civil cases); S. SALTzBuRr & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES
op EvIDENcE MANUAL 520 (4th ed. 1986) (noting that Congress intended special protection of
rule 609(a)(1) against prejudicial prior conviction evidence to protect only criminal defendants);
Smith, Impeaching the Merits: Rule 609(a)(1) and Civil Plaintiffs, 13 N. Ky. L. Ray. 441, 462
(1987) (concluding that rule 609(a) should not apply to prior conviction evidence offered to
impeach plaintiffs in civil trials); Note, The Place for Prior Conviction Evidence in Civil
Actions, 86 CoLuM. L. Rav. 1267, 1273 (1986) (stating that courts should not apply rule
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Wilson, 3 for example, inmate Roy Donald filed a civil rights action against
prison officials who allegedly violated the inmate's eighth and fourteenth
amendment rights.8 4 The trial court admitted Donald's prior rape conviction
into evidence, and the jury found for the defendants.' 5 On appeal the Sixth
Circuit studied whether rule 609(a) should exclude evidence of Donald's
prior rape conviction. 86 The court noted, initially, that rule 609(a) refers to
prejudice to the defendant, not to a plaintiff like Donald.17 After extensively
analyzing various courts' and commentators' opinions on whether to invoke
the rule 609(a) balancing test in civil cases,8" the Sixth Circuit concluded
that Congress never intended rule 609(a) to address the impeachment of
civil plaintiffs by prior conviction evidence. s9 Although the Donald court
did not apply rule 609(a), the court affirmed the trial court's admission of
evidence of Donald's prior rape conviction under rule 403.9

The Campbell court correctly adopted the Sixth Circuit's rationale in
Donald that the rule 609(a) balancing test applies only to criminal defendants. 91 To support the holding that rule 609(a) applies to civil plaintiffs,
the Fifth Circuit in Petty relied on Fifth Circuit precedent.9 2 The Petty

609(a)(1) in civil actions); Note, Prior Convictions Offered for Impeachment in Civil Trials:
The Interaction of FederalRules of Evidence 609(a) and 403, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 1063, 1073
(1986) (asserting that rule 609(a) offers no test for balancing probative value against prejudicial
effect of prior conviction evidence in civil cases).
Other circuits have declined to resolve the issue of whether to apply the rule 609(a)
balancing test in civil cases. See, e.g., Brown v. Flury, 848 F.2d 158, 159 (11th Cir. 1988)
(finding scope of rule 609(a) not ripe for resolution); Abshire v. Walls, 830 F.2d 1277, 1281
(4th Cir. 1987) (declining to decide whether rule 609(a) applies to civil proceeding); Wierstak
v. Heffernan, 789 F.2d 968, 972 (Ist Cir. 1986) (failing to resolve whether rule 609(a) mandates
admission of convictions in civil trial).
83. 847 F.2d 1191 (6th Cir. 1988).
84. See Donald v. Wilson, 847 F.2d 1191, 1193 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating basis of Donald's
claim). Donald claimed that prison officials violated Donald's eighth and fourteenth amendment
rights by taking away his prosthesis, which caused Donald to fall in the shower, and by using
excessive force in removing Donald from his cell. Id.
85. Id. at 1193, 1194.
86. Id. at 1194-98.
87. Id. at 1195.
88. Id. at 1195-97. The Donald court specifically considered Diggs v. Lyons, Campbell
v. Greer, commentators Weinstein, Moore, Louisell, Mueller, and other sources in studying
the applicability of rule 609(a) to civil cases. Id.; see supra note 82 (listing courts and
commentators who have limited use of rule 609(a) to criminal cases).
89. Donald, 847 F.2d at 1197 n.4.
90. Id. at 1197. The court explained that, although the probative value of Donald's
prior conviction was slight, any potential prejudice to Donald was less. Id. at 1198. The court
noted that the jury knew that Donald was a convicted felon because the testimony at trial
described numerous jail-related instances. Id. Further, the court considered defense counsel's
very brief inquiry into the details of Donald's rape conviction to present only a minimal risk
of prejudice to the plaintiff. Id.
91. See infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text (supporting Campbell court's adopting
Sixth Circuit's rationale in Donald); supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text (discussing Sixth
Circuit's rationale for restricting application of rule 609(a) balancing test to criminal trials).
92. See Petty v. Ideco, 761 F.2d 1146, 1152 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing rationale for
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court then placed any rule 609(a) issue within the broad discretion of the
trial court.93 The Petty court completely failed to address the legislative
history of rule 609. 94 In contrast, the Sixth Circuit in Donald appropriately
analyzed rule 609's legislative history and concluded that the drafters of
rule 609 were preoccupied with unfair prejudice to criminal defendants. 95
Consequently, the Sixth Circuit in Donald, unlike the Fifth Circuit in Petty,
correctly followed the intent of the drafters of rule 609.96 The Campbell
court, faced with facts almost identical to Donald, similarly found legislative
preoccupation with protecting criminal defendants and, therefore, restricted
rule 609(a)'s application to criminal defendants. 97 Faced with a potential
loss of liberty, criminal defendants deserve a heightened degree of protection
from possibly prejudicial impeachment evidence.98
Although the Seventh Circuit in Campbell correctly determined that
civil plaintiffs may not demand a rule 609(a) balancing test, the court
erroneously concluded that courts may not exclude prior conviction evidence
in a civil or a criminal trial under rule 403. 99 As a result of Campbell a
party may introduce evidence of any prior criminal conviction, no matter
how damaging, into a Seventh Circuit civil proceeding to impeach a witness.10° Consequently, under the Seventh Circuit's reasoning, no party to a

applying rule 609(a) balancing test to civil plaintiffs). The Fifth Circuit in Petty explained
that, in Howard v. Gonzales, 658 F.2d 352, 358-59 (5th Cir. 1981), the court indicated that
trial courts have broad discretion to apply the rule 609(a) balancing test in civil trials. Id.
93. Petty, 761 F.2d at 1152.
94. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of rule 609).
95. See Donald v. Wilson, 847 F.2d 1191, 1197 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that evidence
of prior convictions offered to attack witness' credibility in civil trial is subject to rule 403
rather than rule 609(a) balancing test) (citing Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 583 (3d Cir. 1984)
(Gibbons, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1078 (1985)). The Diggs dissent, in part,
persuaded the Donald court of the congressional preoccupation under rule 609 with protecting
criminal defendants. Donald, 847 F.2d at 1197; see supra note 67 and accompanying text
(discussing legislative history of rule 609).
96. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of rule 609).
97. See Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing restriction of
rule 609(a) to criminal defendants). The United States Supreme Court should decide the issue
of rule 609's applicability to civil trials in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 845 F.2d
1011 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3029 (U.S. July 19, 1988) (No. 87-1816).
Green presents to the Court the specific question of whether rule 609 mandates the admission
of any felony conviction against a civil plaintiff in a tort action. See 57 U.S.L.W. at 3029
(summarizing issue in Green). The Third Circuit in Green permitted defense counsel to attack
the plaintiff's credibility by introducing evidence that the plaintiff had received a conviction
for statutory rape because the defendant had had consensual sexual relations with a girl
younger than 14 and, in addition, that the plaintiff had participated in a burglary. See id.
(relying on Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1078 (1985)).
98. See generally W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CAIUmnAL PROCEDURE 26 (1985) (noting that

protecting accused is important goal of criminal process and one that requires great accuracy
of guilty verdict).
99. See infra notes 104-08, 137-42 and accompanying text (discussing injustice of Campbell court's rule 403 holding).
100. See Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 708 (1987) (discussing consequences of Campbell
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civil suit may enjoy the protection of a rule 403 balancing of prejudicial
effect against probative value.' 0' By holding that rule 403 may not exclude
prior conviction evidence that a party offers for impeachment purposes, the
Campbell court failed to consider the legislative intent behind rule 403 and
the case law that supports applying rule 403 to prior conviction evidence in

civil trials.1 02
The Advisory Committee's Note to rule 403 suggests that rule 403 is a
general rule of evidence that governs when no specific rule of evidence
applies. 03 After holding a specific rule, rule 609(a), inapplicable to prior
conviction evidence in civil trials, the next logical step for the Campbell
court would have been to apply rule 403 in civil trials.' °4 The Seventh
Circuit, nonetheless, failed to take the logical step of applying rule 403
and, instead, removed the entire prior conviction issue beyond the scope of
rule 403.105 Numerous commentators agree that Congress intended rule 403
to apply generally to exclude unfairly prejudicial evidence in civil and
criminal trials.'0 Rule 403 allows a trial judge to exclude evidence that the
7
judge believes presents a great risk of unfair prejudice to the defendantY'
By placing prior conviction evidence outside the reach of both the rule 403
and the rule 609(a) balancing tests, the Seventh Circuit runs a substantial
08
risk of allowing prior conviction evidence to prejudice parties in civil trials.'

decision). The concurring judge in Campbell notes that, under the majority's analysis, the trial
judge has no discretion to exclude even highly prejudicial evidence of prior criminal convictions.
Id.
101. Id.
102. See infra notes 103, 106-07, 124-35 and accompanying text (discussing advisory
committee's note, commentators, and case law addressing rule 403's applicability in civil cases).
103. See FED. R. EvD. 403 advisory committee's note (discussing use of rule 403 in
absence of specific rule of evidence). The relevancy rules in Article IV of the Federal Rules
of Evidence are concrete applications created for particular situations. Id. However, these
Article IV rules reflect the policies underlying rule 403, which is a general guide that governs
when no specific rule applies. Id.
104. See infra notes 106, 124-35 and accompanying text (discussing widespread application
of rule 403 to prior conviction evidence in civil trials).
105. Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 706 (7th Cir. 1987); see Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d
577, 583 (1984) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (declaring that majority incorrectly placed use of
prior conviction evidence outside of court's discretion under rule 403), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1078 (1985).
106. See, e.g., C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 185 at 545 (3d ed. 1984) (stating that rule
403 codifies common-law power of judges to exclude prejudicial relevant evidence); S. SALTzBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RuILES op EVIDENCE MANUAL 141 (4th ed. 1986) (noting that
few rules, with possible exception of rule 609(a)(2), deny judges discretion to exclude prejudicial
evidence under rule 403); 1 J. WEmlsTm, EVIDENCE 403[01] at 403-5 (1988) (noting that
balancing approach of rule 403 applies to all types of impeachment evidence except possibly
rule 609(a)(2) offenses).
107. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (text of rule 403).
108. See Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that neither
rule 609 nor rule 403 apply to prior conviction evidence offered to impeach witnesses in civil
trials); supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing dangers of allowing prior conviction
evidence into civil trials).
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The only federal circuit court opinion that supports the Campbell court's
limitation on the applicability of rule 403 to prior conviction evidence is
Diggs v. Lyons.106 In Diggs the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit addressed a civil rights action against various prison officials." 0
The plaintiffs alleged that certain officials used excessive force to prevent
the plaintiffs' escape from prison."' The trial court, over objection by
Diggs' counsel, permitted counsel for the defendants to introduce Diggs'
prior convictions into evidence.' 2 The jury returned a verdict in favor of
the defendants.'
On appeal the Third Circuit upheld the lower court's admission of the
prior conviction evidence under rule 609(a)." 4 The court studied the legislative history of rule 609115 and found no suggestion that Congress intended

to limit the applicability of rule 609(a) to criminal cases." 6 In essence the
Diggs court held that rule 609(a) preempts rule 403 in determining the
admissibility of prior conviction evidence." 7 The Third Circuit concluded
that rule 403 gives the trial judge no authority beyond rule 609(a) to exclude
prior conviction evidence."' The only authority that the Diggs court cited

109. 741 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1078 (1985).
110. Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 578 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1078 (1985).
The plaintiffs in Diggs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants unconstitutionally used excessive force in preventing plaintiffs' escape from prison. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. Defense counsel cross-examined Diggs on his prior convictions for murder, bank
robbery, attempted prison escape, and criminal conspiracy. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 582.
115. Id. at 579-81. The Diggs court conceded that Congress, in devising rule 609(a),
primarily focused on criminal cases and criminal defendants. Id. at 580-81.
116. Id. at 581. In particular, the statements of Representatives Dennis, Hogan, and Lott
influenced the Diggs court that rule 403 does not apply to prior conviction evidence in civil
cases because a specific rule, rule 609, governs all questions concerning the admissibility of
prior conviction evidence. Id; see supra note 66 and accompanying text (remarks of Representatives Dennis, Hogan, and Lott).
A thorough examination of the rule 609 legislative debate suggests that the Diggs court
rested its decision that rule 609 would apply to exclude prior conviction evidence offered in
civil cases exclusively on a few atypical remarks that the Diggs court gleaned from the
Congressional debate of rule 609. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing
legislative history of rule 609). The primary Congressional concern during the debate over rule
609 was with potential prejudice to criminal defendants. See supra note 67 (containing House
Conference Committee remarks on rule 609).
117. See Diggs, 741 F.2d at 582 (suggesting that Diggs court found that rule 609(a)
preempts rule 403 with respect to prior conviction evidence).
118. Id. at 581. The Diggs court relied on United States v. Wong, 703 F.2d 65 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 482 (1983), in holding that rule 609 precludes applicability of rule 403
to exclude prior conviction evidence. Diggs, 741 F.2d at 581. In Wong, the trial court convicted
Wong of mail fraud and violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act. Wong, 703 F.2d at 66. On appeal Wong argued that the trial court erroneously admitted
evidence of two prior convictions involving rule 609(a)(2) crimes without weighing the prejudicial
effect of the evidence under rule 403. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit upheld the lower court's admission of the evidence. Id. at 68. The Third Circuit held
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for the proposition that rule 609(a) completely displaces rule 403 with
respect to prior conviction evidence was a single criminal case in which the
Third Circuit considered the admissibility of various rule 609(a)(2) crimes." 9
Accordingly, the Diggs court relied, in a civil case, on the rationale of a
criminal case involving crimes of dishonesty and false statement. 20 The
Diggs court's limitation of rule 403, therefore, stands on weak precedent
and offers insufficient support for the Campbell court's holding that courts
may not apply rule 403 to prior conviction evidence offered for impeachment
2
of witnesses in civil cases.1 '
In contrast to the Campbell court, the majority of federal courts have
applied rule 403 more flexibly to prior conviction evidence that a party
introduces to impeach a witness in a civil case. '2 Although courts generally
agree that rule 609(a) applies to prior conviction evidence in criminal trials,'2
numerous courts have held that the rule 403 balancing test similarly protects
24
parties to civil trials from unfairly prejudicial prior conviction evidence.
One of the first civil cases to apply rule 403 to prior conviction evidence is
Shows v. M/V Red Eagle.125 In Shows an employee sued his employer to

that the rule 403 balancing test is not applicable to impeachment by evidence of rule 609(a)(2)
convictions. Id.
119. Diggs, 741 F.2d at 581; see supra note 118 (discussing Diggs court's reliance on
criminal case of United States v. Wong, 703 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1983)).
120. Diggs, 741 F.2d at 581. Judge Gibbons, the dissenting judge in Diggs, characterized
the majority's holding as activistic. Id. at 583. Judge Gibbons argued that the majority had
blazed its own trail by ruling that the admission of prior conviction evidence for impeachment
of any witness in a civil trial is mandatory. Id. The dissenting judge noted that under the
majority's holding an attorney could, for example, use prior conviction evidence to impeach
a totally disinterested witness testifying on whether a light at an intersection was red or green.
Id. Judge Gibbons concluded that requiring courts to admit prior conviction evidence in all
cases would produce absurd results at trial. Id.
121. See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text (discussing Campbell court's refusal
to apply rule 403 in context of prior conviction evidence).
122. See infra notes 124-35 and accompanying text (discussing majority position on rule
403's role with respect to prior conviction evidence in civil cases).
123. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing courts that have applied rule
609(a) to prior conviction evidence in criminal trials).
124. See, e.g., Donald v. Wilson, 847 F.2d 1191, 1197 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that
evidence of prior conviction used to impeach party or nonparty witness in civil trial is subject
to rule 403 balancing test); Abshire v. Walls, 830 F.2d 1277, 1281 (4th Cir. 1987) (affirming,
under rule 403, trial court's exclusion of civil plaintiff's prior conviction); Wierstak v.
Heffernan, 789 F.2d 968, 972 (5th Cir. 1986) (upholding trial court's exclusion in civil trial
under rule 403 of prior convictions for possession of hypodermic needle and heroin); Czajka
v. Hickman, 703 F.2d 317, 319 (8th Cir. 1983) (ruling that courts must apply rule 403 in civil
cases when party seeks to cross-examine opposing party about criminal convictions); Shows v.
M/V Red Eagle, 695 F.2d 114, 118 (5th Cir. 1983) (concluding that protective effect of rule
403 pervades rules of evidence including prior conviction evidence in civil trials); Moore v.
Volkswagenwerk, 575 F. Supp. 919, 921-22 (D. Md. 1983) (deciding that rule 403 rather than
rule 609(a) applies to exclude prior conviction evidence in civil case); Tussel v. Witco Chem.
Corp., 555 F. Supp. 979, 984 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that rule 609(a) does not preclude
courts from applying rule 403 balancing test to prior conviction evidence in civil case).
125. 695 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1983).
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recover for injuries that the employee incurred while working on the
employer's boat. 2 6 The defendant employer sought to impeach the plaintiff's

credibility by introducing evidence of the plaintiff's prior conviction for

armed robbery. 2 7 The trial court admitted the evidence, and the jury held

for the defendant.12 On appeal the Fifth Circuit declined to rule on whether
courts should apply the rule 609(a) balancing test in civil trials and, instead,
reversed the trial court on the basis of rule 403.129 The Fifth Circuit explained

that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of Shows's prior conviction

and, thereby, unfairly prejudiced Shows. 130 The Shows court conceded that

the prior conviction was relevant to Shows' credibility.13 ' The
cluded, however, that the prior conviction evidence was unfairly
to the plaintiff because the conviction occurred ten years before
lawsuit and because defense counsel unnecessarily probed into

court conprejudicial
the Shows
the nature

of the offense, the prison time that Shows served, and the conditions of
Shows' parole. 32 The court determined that the defense attorney used the

133
prior conviction evidence primarily to trigger the jury's punitive instincts.
According to the Fifth Circuit, the trial judge should have recognized that
the protective effect of rule 403 permeates the Federal Rules of Evidence
and can apply to exclude prejudicial evidence of a prior conviction in a

civil trial. 3 4 Consequently, the Shows court reversed the trial court for
failing to apply rule 403 to exclude evidence of Shows' prior conviction.'35

126. See Shows v. M/V Red Eagle, 695 F.2d 114, 115 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding reversible
error because of admission in civil trial of plaintiff's ten-year old conviction for armed
robbery). Shows claimed that the defendants were negligent in maintaining and controlling the
boat at the time of the accident. Id. Shows testified that as he swung on a rope from the
platform to the deck of the ship, the deck rose with the surge of the ship, resulting in his
injury. Id. at 116.
127. Id. During cross-examination of Shows, the defense counsel in Shows suggested that
Shows had been in prison. Id. After an extended bench conference and an off-the-record
conference, defense counsel continued to interrogate Shows about his armed robbery conviction.
Id.
128. Id.at 115.
129. Id. at 119. The Shows court noted, further, that the trial court abused rule 609 itself
by allowing defense counsel to inquire at length into the details of the prior conviction. Id.
The court maintained that evidence of the plaintiff's prior conviction had little probative value
and a great deal of prejudice. Id. at 115. The Shows court concluded, therefore, that rule 609
would have excluded the evidence. Id. at 119. The Shows court decided, however, to use rule
403 to exclude the evidence. Id.
130. Id. at 118.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 119.
134. Id. at 118. The Shows court reasoned that the protective effect of rule 403 pertains
to all of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id.; see Jones v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 844 F.2d
500, 505 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing with approval Shows" holding that rule 403 applies throughout
Rules of Evidence), petition for cert. filed, - U.S.L.W. - (U.S. Aug. 18, 1988) (No. -);
Czajka v. Hickman, 703 F.2d 317, 319 (8th Cir. 1983) (same).
135. Shows, 695 F.2d at 119.
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While courts and commentators alike have cited with approval the
Shows court's application of rule 403 to prior conviction evidence, 3 6 the
Campbell court declined to follow Shows. 3 7 In Campbell, by refusing to
apply rule 403 to prior conviction evidence in a civil trial, the Seventh
Circuit unreasonably eliminated rule 403 protection.' The Campbell court's
construction of rule 403, combined with the court's narrow reading of rule
609(a), permits a party in a civil trial to impeach a witness using evidence
of any prior conviction, regardless of the relevance or prejudicial effect of
the evidence.3 9 By admitting evidence of prior convictions with no prior
rule 609(a) or rule 403 balancing test, Seventh Circuit courts may permit
unfairly prejudicial evidence to deny fair trials to civil parties.' 40 The Seventh
Circuit, therefore, should abandon its decision in Campbell regarding rule
403."4 Seventh Circuit practitioners, meanwhile, can minimize the danger
of Campbell's rule 403 holding by requesting precautionary jury instructions
when prior conviction evidence does not bear a strong relation to the
42
substantive issues of a civil suit.

136. See infra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing propriety of applying rule 403
to prior conviction evidence).
137. See Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 706 (7th Cir. 1987) (refusing to follow Shows).
138. See id. (holding that court may not exclude prior conviction evidence under rule 403
in either criminal or civil case); S. SALTZBuRG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULEs OF EvIDENCE
520-21 (4th ed. 1986) (contending that Congress intended general notion of balancing harmful
attributes of prior convictions to protect all parties, not just criminal defendants, against undue
prejudice); I J. WEnwsTEN, EVIDENCE 403101] at 403-05 (1988) (asserting that -courts should
employ rule 403 balancing test to determine admissibility of all types of impeachment evidence,
except possibly in cases involving rule 609(a)(2) crimes); Note, The Placefor Prior Conviction
Evidence in Civil Actions, 86 COLUM. L. Rav. 1267, 1282 (1986) (arguing that judges must
subject prior felony evidence in civil cases to rule 403 balancing test); Note, Prior Convictions
Offeredfor Impeachment in Civil Trials: The Interaction of Federal Rules of Evidence 609(a)
and 403, 54 Foana L. REv. 1063, 1078 (1986) (suggesting that judges apply rule 403 to
prior conviction evidence in civil trials to guard against possible unfair prejudice); Comment,
Tussel v. Witco Chemical Corp., 22 DuQ. L. REv. 535, 545 (1984) (asserting that rule 403
may exclude prior conviction evidence in civil trials even if rule 609 also applies); Comment,
Evidence-Impeachment of Witnesses by PriorFelony Convictions: A New Approach in Civil
Litigation, 13 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 413, 421 (1983) (agreeing with Tussel court's holding that
rule 609 does not preclude application of rule 403 in civil case).
139. Campbell, 831 F.2d at 708 (Will, J., concurring); see supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing trial judges' lack of discretion after Campbell to exclude even highly
prejudicial evidence).
140. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing dangers of admitting prior
conviction evidence).
141. See COMMrrTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO Tim FEDERAL RULES

OF APPEL.ATE PROCEDURE, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, FEDERAL RULEs OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EvIDHEcE 29 (1988) (suggesting that courts

admit prior conviction evidence that party offers for impeachment of any witness other than
criminal defendant, but subject to rule 403).
142. See 2 D. LoUIsELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 125 at 19 (1985) (stating
that institution of jury system implies some faith in limiting instructions and in good sense of
jury members). Precautionary jury instructions, however, may have only limited effectiveness.
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In Campbell v. Greer the Seventh Circuit considered the proper appli-

cation of rule 609(a) and rule 403 in excluding prior conviction evidence
that a party offers for impeachment purposes in a civil trial. 143 Relying on
the legislative history of rule 609 and precedent from other federal courts, 1"
the Campbell court correctly concluded that the balancing test of rule 609(a)
does not apply in civil actions.14- However, by further concluding that courts

may not exclude prior conviction evidence under rule 403,' 46 the Seventh
Circuit effectively ruled that a court in a civil trial must admit prior
conviction evidence, regardless of the potentially prejudicial effect to the
witness. 147 As a result of the Seventh Circuit's holding in Campbell, prior
criminal convictions may overwhelm the substance of meritorious civil
claims. 14 By preventing Seventh Circuit courts from excluding highly prej-

udicial prior conviction evidence under rule 403, the Campbell court potentially allows tangential criminal convictions to prevent a party to a civil suit
49
from receiving a fair trial.
J. GARETT HORSLEY

See 3 D. LouisELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE

§

315 at 317 n.4 (1985) (citing survey

suggesting ineffectiveness of jury instructions); supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing
possibility that jury may fail to limit consideration of prior conviction evidence to issue of
witness' veracity).
143. See supra notes 28-48 and accompanying text (discussing Campbell court's analysis
of rule 609 and rule 403).
144. See supra notes 67, 82-90 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history and
case law concerning scope of rule 609).
145. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing Campbell court's ruling that
only criminal defendants may receive protection of rule 609(a) balancing test).
146. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing Campbell court's ruling that
court may not exclude prior conviction evidence under rule 403 in civil trial).
147. See supra notes 100-42 and accompanying text (discussing dangerous result of
Campbell court's combined rule 609 and rule 403 holdings).
148. See supra notes 69, 120, 124-42 and accompanying text (discussing dangers of
admitting prior conviction evidence without prior balancing of prejudicial effect against
probative value).
149. See supra notes 69, 82, 120, 124-48 and accompanying text (discussing dangers of
admitting prior conviction evidence and Tussel court's statement that prior conviction may be
tangential to present case).

